Treatment of Interest on Debtor
Obligations in Reorganizations Under the
Bankruptcy Code
Walter J. Blumt
After four years of experience with reorganizations under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 (the "Code"),
we are now in a position to reexamine some questions about interest on obligations of the debtor in bankruptcy reorganizations-questions that are old but emerge in a changed context
under the new Code.

Does interest run on unsecured interest-bearing obligations of
the debtor after the filing of a petition for reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Code?
This question carries a lot of historical baggage. The pre-Code
statute did not address it for either secured or unsecured obligations. The courts developed one rule for liquidations and another
for reorganizations. They established early that in an ordinary
bankruptcy liquidation no interest would run after the filing of the
petition,2 except that interest at the applicable legal rate would be
credited if something of value were left after the allowed principal
claims of all creditors had been satisfied in full.3 Extrapolating
from these rules, the courts later determined that postpetition interest would be allowed at the contract rate in reorganizations in
two situations: (1) on secured claims, so long as the value of the
collateral covered the enlarged sum, and (2) on unsecured claims,
t Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
I Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended as Title 11 of the United
States Code (Supp. V 1981)). Chapter 11 is found at 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1174 (Supp. V 1981).
Chapters in the Bankruptcy Code are identified with Arabic numerals; Roman numerals
were used for chapter designations in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as
amended by the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 894 (1938), which the Code repealed.
2 Sexton v. Dreyfus (In re Kessler & Co.), 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911) (disallowance of
postpetition interest in bankruptcy liquidations is a "fundamental principle" founded on
150 years of English practice).
3

In re Inland Gas Corp., 241 F.2d 374, 379-81 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 838

(1957).
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provided that equity owners continued to participate in the busi4
ness under the reorganization plan.
This rule for unsecured creditors had special significance when
there were two or more classes of debt holders whose investments
either carried different rates of interest or stood at different levels
in the claims hierarchy. If interest payments were denied, classes
that held securities with low interest rates or whose obligations
were subordinated benefited relative to competing classes holding
claims with higher interest rates or that were unsubordinated. In a
memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court supporting a petition for a writ of certiorari in Gregory v. Columbia Gas System, 5
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") vigorously argued 6 against applying the liquidation interest rules to reorganizations involving two levels of unsecured creditors.
The most important, and in our view controlling, difference [between ordinary bankruptcy and reorganizations] is
that the debtor's assets in bankruptcy constitute a "dead
fund" . . . which is to be simply liquidated and divided
among the creditors. The assets are normally unproductive
during the delay incident to liquidation, and it is perhaps not
unreasonable to require the burden of delay to be borne
equally by all the creditors by not allowing interest to any. If
interest were allowed, the delay would simply change the distribution of the fund without increasing its size. In reorganization, however, the assets which would in bankruptcy have
been distributed outright to the senior creditors are retained
by the trustee and used to continue the business in operation
during the reorganization. Profits earned during that operation will be available for other creditors and the losses, if any,
must be borne by the senior creditors, all of whose claims
might have been satisfied by an immediate liquidation of the

City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 330 n.7 (1949); Ticonic Nat'1 Bank v.
Sprague, 303 U.S. 406, 413 (1938); Memorandum for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 12, Gregory v. Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 359 U.S. 979 (1959), denying cert. to In re
Inland Gas Corp., 262 F.2d 510 (6th Cir.) [hereinafter cited as SEC Memorandum].
' In re Inland Gas Corp., 262 F.2d 510 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gregory v.
Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 359 U.S. 979 (1959).
I The SEC was a party to the Columbia Gas proceedings pursuant to § 208 of Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act, Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 894 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. Section 208
authorized the SEC to intervene in Chapter X proceedings as a real party in interest with
the right to be heard on all matters arising in the proceeding upon judicial request or upon

its own motion with judicial consent.
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business. In this context interest is in no sense a "penalty" for
the delay in payment but is simply fair compensation to the
senior creditors for the productive use by the estate of the assets owing to them. 7
The effort of the SEC to revise the rules failed when the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the case. 8
The new Code moved the law in the opposite direction. The
Code does not allow postpetition interest at contract rates for unsecured claimants,' and this principle extends even to situations in
which equity owners retain a position in the ongoing enterprise.'0
The unfairness the SEC perceived in the old rules is magnified by
the new regime. During the time a reorganization plan is being
worked out, the old shareholders might gain at the expense of debenture holders because the shareholders, without paying interest,
in effect are able to use the assets that were funded, directly or
indirectly, by issuance of the debentures. This state of affairs
might easily encourage the old equity owners to drag out the reorganization proceedings as long as possible. If the enterprise is profitable (after taking account of interest due on adequately secured
claims), its value normally will increase, whereas the allowable
claims of unsecured creditors remain frozen. As a result, the old
equity owners might be in a position to capture for themselves any
increase in value attributable to retaining profits in the firm-even
when the retained profits are less than the realistic interest costs
on the unsecured debt."
supra note 4, at 16-17.
359 U.S. 979 (1959).
11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). Section 502(b)(2) disallows claims for interest
on unsecured obligations unmatured at the time of petition. Id. The Senate report noted
"interest stops accruing at the date of the filing of the petition." S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5849. The Code still allows interest on secured obligations, at the
contract rate, up to the value of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. V 1981). The
problem of interest on secured claims is discussed in Comment, Compensation for Time
Value as Part of Adequate Protection During the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U.
Cm. L. REv. 305 (1983).
7 SEC Memorandum,

20 Equity holders may participate in a reorganization with the consent of each class of
creditors, provided dissenting members of each class receive liquidation value; if a class of
creditors does not consent, equity holders may participate once dissenting classes are compensated in full under the fair and equitable standard. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (Supp. V 1981). See
infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Because postpetition interest not covered by the
value of the collateral is not an allowed claim, equity holders may participate before the
payment of postpetition interest.
21 The purpose of reorganizing rather than liquidating in bankruptcy is to allow contin-

ued productive use of the debtor's assets. Liquidation disposes of the assets of debtors who
cannot profitably continue production as a reorganized entity. Disallowance of interest

1983]

Interest in Reorganization

One can only speculate as to why the Code mandates such an
unjust outcome.12 A somewhat complicated answer may be inferred
from the Code's standards for deciding whether to confirm reorganization plans. Pre-Code law employed two standards. It applied
the "fair and equitable" standard to Chapter X of the old Bankruptcy Act,13 which, generally speaking, governed publicly held
corporations; 4 it applied the "best interest of the creditors" test to
proceedings under Chapter XI of the Act, 15 which, again generally
speaking, governed corporations without public creditors.16 The
fair and equitable standard is bottomed on the notion that in a
reorganization a higher class of investors, as defined by rights in
liquidation, is entitled to be compensated in full before a lower
class of investors may be permitted to continue in the enterprise
undergoing reorganization. 7 The best interest of the creditors test
is grounded on a different idea: a readjustment plan can be confirmed, even though the superior class is not accorded full compensation, so long as its members receive not less than the amount
available to them through a liquidation in bankruptcy. s The new
Code emphasizes heavily the best interest of the creditors test in
claims of unsecured creditors in reorganizations may allow equity owners to continue to run
a debtor corporation whose revenues do not exceed the total cost of operation, including
interest expenses. To the extent that interest claims do not accrue after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the reorganized entity might appear profitable, and those profits can
inure to the benefit of the stockholders.
12 There is a school of thought that believes the outcome is not unjust because the then
interested parties presumably took the result into account in striking the deal at the time
the securities were first issued, producing a higher rate of interest on the debentures by
virtue of the rule against postpetition interest. Whether or not this reasoning is correct in
the case of recent borrowings, it should be noted that the Code rule applies to securities
issued before enactment.
Is Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 221(2), 52 Stat. 840, 883, 897 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
14 By its terms Chapter X was not the only law applicable to reorganizations of publicly
held corporations. Chapter X included substantive protections, however, that were widely
thought necessary when publicly held corporations entered reorganizations. Chapter X typically was applied to publicly held corporations. See General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350
U.S. 462, 465-67 (1956).
15Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 366, 52 Stat. 840, 905, 911-12 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
16 In Chapter XI, the debtor remained in control of its property and advanced a plan of
reorganization itself, rather than through a trustee. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 221(2), 52 Stat.
840, 883, 897 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §
401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. Chapter XI lacked the substantive protections of Chapter X and
typically was applied to privately held corporations. See supra note 14.
17 Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 527-31 (1941); Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114-19 (1939).
18 Fleischmann & Devine, Inc. v. Saul Wolfson Dry Goods Co., 299 F. 15, 18-19 (5th Cir.
1924).
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combining it with the fair and equitable standard in setting the
level for plan confirmation.19
The choice of a standard for confirmation of a plan of reorganization now depends on class approval. Creditors and equity hold,ers are divided by the court into classes, the members of each class
having substantially similar claims or interests.2 0 A class can either
approve or reject the plan.2 1 The reach of the fair and equitable
standard is confined to a class of creditors or equity owners that
does not approve the plan by the prescribed majority;22 dissenters
within a class that approves the plan are entitled only to the protection offered by the best interest of the creditors test.2 3 The es-

sence of the Code is to hold out a higher level of protection to a
dissenting class than to the dissenting members of a class that accepts a reorganization plan. It is implicitly assumed that the primary protection for an investor is the good judgment of the majority of his class, but the majority will not be permitted to force a
dissenter into a position that offers less than the dissenter would
receive in an immediate liquidation of the business.2
This perspective may well have contributed to the new rule on
postpetition interest. A class of debt investors is unlikely to accept
a plan that denies it postpetition interest while old equity owners
stay in the enterprise. Although postpetition interest is not an allowable claim, 25 nothing in the Code prevents unsecured creditors
from insisting on its inclusion in the package they receive if the old
stockholders get something under the plan. The same can be said
of creditors in classes at different levels in the priority hierarchy.
19 Reorganizations fall within Chapter 11 of the new Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174
(Supp. V 1981). The standard for plan confirmation is found in id. § 1129.
20 Id. § 1122. Different types of equity holders and creditors are segregated into differ.ent classes. For example, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, common stockholders, and
preferred stockholders will each form at least one separate class. Senior and junior unsecured debt will be divided into separate classes, and because of the unique nature of security interests, each secured creditor may form a separate class.
2X A plan can be approved by class vote. A positive vote representing one-half of the
members and two-thirds of the dollar amount of a class is necessary for a class of creditors
to approve a plan. Approval by a class of equity holders requires a positive vote representing
two-thirds of the class dollar value only. Id. § 1126. A class whose interests are not impaired
by a reorganization plan is deemed to have approved the plan. Id. § 1126(0. See infra notes
35-36 and accompanying text.
22 As long as members of a class junior in priority participate in the reorganized entity,
a plan cannot be confirmed over the objection of a dissenting senior class of creditors unless
that class is compensated in full. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. V 1981).
:- Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
4 A dissenting creditor is ensured at least the liquidation value protection of the best
interest of the creditors test. Id.
15 Id. See supra note 9.
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Senior debenture holders, for example, are not likely to approve a
plan that fails to recognize postpetition interest on their investment while junior debenture holders get something under the plan.
In either of these situations the junior class can, under the
Code, seek confirmation of the plan over the objection of the seniors. 6 It then could be argued that the rejected plan is fair and
equitable to the seniors in that their allowable claims, which do
not include postpetition interest, are compensated in full. The
availability of this approach does buttress the position of the juniors. In practice, however, juniors usually will be well advised to
make concessions to seniors in order to obtain class approval and
thereby avoid resort to a cram-down proceeding. 7 The fact is that
cram-down disputes often entail a valuation of new paper in the
continuing enterprise,2 8 and for that reason alone juniors cannot be
assured of a favorable outcome. Thus there is likely to be considerable room for bargaining between senior and junior classes as to
postpetition interest on debentures and other unsecured interestbearing obligations. 29 A compromise might be expected to provide
seniors with compensation for some portion of the total amount of
postpetition interest.
The respective bargaining positions will be slightly different
when the contending classes are unsecured creditors on the same
rung of the priorities ladder but holding claims that carried interest at different rates.30 If, without considering postpetition interest,

26 Upon request, the court may confirm a plan over the objections of a class, provided
the plan is fair and equitable, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. V 1981), and any creditor or
creditor's committee may propose such a plan, id. § 1121(c).
'7 The approval of a plan over the objection of a creditor or equity holder is a "cram
down." A plan, as noted earlier, can be "crammed down" on a dissenting member of an
approving class by meeting the best interest of the creditors test, but a plan can be
crammed down on a dissenting class only if the fair and equitable standard is satisfied. See
supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
U' Creditors are often given obligations of the reconstituted enterprise, requiring valuation of that enterprise to ensure that the plan meets the requirements of § 1129.
29 The juniors and seniors of course could bargain on the entire package to be given the
seniors without ever focusing on postpetition interest. But because postpetition interest can
be computed as a separate item, there is a likelihood that it will be isolated in the
negotiations.
30 This assumes that for voting purposes the two sets of debenture owners would be
placed in separate classes. If they were grouped together, the low-interest debenture holders,
under some circumstances, might then have enough votes to bring about acceptance of the
plan by the single combined class-in which case the fair and equitable standard would not
apply. If the single class rejected the plan and the old equity interests sought a cram down,
then the omission of postpetition interest at differential rates would not be a ground for
refusing to confirm the plan over the class's dissent. Indeed, prescribing such differential
interest as part of the plan would violate the statutory rule that, to be eligible for cram
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the plan provides both classes with identical compensation, the
lower interest-rate class would be in a strong posture to have the.
plan crammed down on the higher interest-rate class. In the supposed case there would be no need to place a value on debtor paper to be distributed, inasmuch as the plan compensates the two
classes alike for each dollar of claim. The Code renders the only
distinction between the classes-postpetition interest-wholly irrelevant, and the lower interest-rate class therefore would have little incentive to concede better treatment to the higher-rate class
on the basis of a differential in interest rates.
In relying heavily on majority vote to protect members of a
class, the Code, in short, does not adequately deal with the postpetition interest problem. The analysis of the SEC in Gregory v.
Columbia Gas System merits legislative reconsideration.31
II
Is the holder of a secured debtor obligation entitled to interest
on interest payments that are in default?
Under pre-Code law this question was not addressed by the
governing statute which, as noted, did not deal even with simple
postpetition interest. The Supreme Court decided in 1946 in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green3 2 that clauses in
instruments calling for interest on interest in default were unenforceable in bankruptcy if the lower court directed the debtor not
to pay interest as due.3 3
The obligation to make prompt payment of simple interest
coupons was suspended. In fact, both [the debtor] and the receiver were ordered by the court not to pay the coupons on
the dates they were, on their face, supposed to have been
paid .... The extra interest covenant may be deemed added
compensation for the creditor or, what is more likely, something like a penalty to induce prompt payment of simple interest. In either event, first mortgage bondholders would have
been enriched and subordinate creditors would have suffered
a corresponding loss, because of a failure to pay when paydown, a plan must not discriminate unfairly. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981). A plan
unfairly discriminates when dissenting classes of the same priority are treated differently.
SI See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. For a suggested legislative solution, see
Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1148, 1161-65 (1981).
32 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
33 Id. at 165-67.
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ment had been prohibited by a court order entered for the
joint benefit of debtor, creditors, and the public. Such a result
is not consistent with equitable principles. For legal suspension of an obligation to pay is an adequate reason why no
added compensation
or penalty should be enforced for failure
34
to pay

Although nothing in the legislation suggests that Congress intended to change this principle, the Code introduces a new concept
that raises a novel question about interest on interest in arrears.
Under the Code, creditors in a class will be treated as unimpaired,
and consequently deemed to have accepted a plan of reorganization 5 if the plan (1) cures any default by the debtor on obligations
to them, (2) reinstates the maturity of their claims as it stood
before default, (3) compensates them for damages incurred as a
result of reasonable reliance on a contractual provision or law that
entitles them to receive accelerated payment after occurrence of a
default, and (4) does not otherwise alter their rights. 6 The novel
question is, should this prescription be construed to mean that interest on any interest in arrears must be paid in order for the
claims of a class to be unimpaired?
The Code itself omits any mention of interest on arrearages,
and the legislative history is silent on the subject. One might argue
that the statutory language rules out requiring payment of
compounding interest: when the statute speaks of providing compensation for damages, it refers only to damages attributable to
reasonable reliance on a right of acceleration. 7 To qualify for compensation, a creditor presumably must show that he suffered damages from engaging in some course of conduct on the assumption
that payment of the debt would be accelerated as a result of a default. Yet it is not implausible to interpret the statute as covering
interest on an arrearage. Were an acceleration permitted, the creditor would receive payment of the debt and then be in a position to
invest those funds at interest and to earn interest on that interest.
Everyone who invests in interest-bearing securities, it can be assumed, anticipates being able to engage in such additional investment and hence can be considered to have relied on that opportunity. To ignore the value of a compound interest opportunity is to
deny the creditor compensation for damages that go to the very
essence of his investment.
Id.
11
6 Id.
37 Id.
34

:5

at 166-67.
U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. V 1981).
§ 1124(2)
§ 1124(2)(c).
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Admittedly this interpretation stretches the statutory language. It nonetheless is in keeping with the informing notion of an.
unimpaired claim-which is, in brief, that the creditor's position
has not been made worse by virtue of reorganization under the
plan.
III
What rate of interest is to be used in figuring the worth of new
obligations of the debtor enterprise that are allocated by a reorganization plan to creditors whose claims are impaired under the
arrangement?
The selection of the interest rate has long been a central question in reorganization law. Its importance has been reduced by a
feature of the new Code that enables a majority, pursuant to the
best interest of the creditors test, to bind an entire class of creditors, including its dissenting members, to a plan that provides the
entire class with obligations of the debtor having a value not less
than the amount available to them through a liquidation in bankruptcy. 8 But the question retains its vitality in deciding whether,
under the fair and equitable standard, a plan can be crammed
down on a dissenting class. In many situations the answer to that
question is likely to bear heavily on whether some class will accept
or reject a proferred plan.
The Code did not purport to change the essence of the fair
and equitable standard by limiting it to cram-down occasions. A
dissenting class senior in the hierarchy of liquidation priorities is
still entitled to full compensation before a junior class is entitled to
participate in the reorganized operation.3 9 The Code, however, incorporated statutory language that is more specific than many
older judicial formulations of the full compensation rule.40 For convenience in exposition, assume that the compensation to an impaired class is to consist entirely of new and/or modified obligations of the debtor undergoing reorganization. The Code prescribes
Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), (C)(ii). See Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in
Corporate Reorganizations, 25 U. CH. L. RFv. 417 (1958).
40 E.g., compare Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116 (1939)
(" 'any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights and interests of the
stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either class of
creditors comes within judicial denunciation"' (quoting Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville,
N.A. & C. Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899))) with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1981)
(creditor must receive compensation equal to the "allowed amount of such claim").
39
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that for a plan to be properly confirmed over the dissent of a secured class, the members of the class must receive new obligations,
secured by the old collateral, in a principal sum equal to the
amount of the allowed claim and having a present value equal to
the worth of the collateral.4 1 For a plan to be properly confirmed
over the dissent of an unsecured class, the new paper received
must have a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the
amount of the allowed claim. 42 The Code thus spotlights the continued importance, under the fair and equitable standard, of determining the present value of promises by the debtor to make payments in the future.
To determine its present value, a sum due in the future must,
of course, be discounted to reflect the interest forgone by the creditor during the period the debtor has use of the funds.43 In arm's
length negotiations between a potential borrower and potential
lender, the interest rate on a loan agreement generally will approximate the rate that the lender could obtain in the market for putting out his funds during an equal time span and at a comparable
risk of timely payment of both interest and principal. The interest
rate governing the loan is equivalent to the rate at which all future
payments under the agreement are discounted by the parties to
reach present values. A newly negotiated loan accordingly will always have a present value equal to the amount of the loan. An
inquiry into the proper rate for discounting the debtor's promise to
pay in the future is therefore necessarily the same as an inquiry
into the rate of interest to be associated with the creditor's
investment.
As an aid to analysis, one can think of impaired creditor
classes in a reorganization as making new forced loans to the
debtor entity. If the command of the statute were to be carried out
literally, cram down would be authorized only if members of the
dissenting class received an allocation of new paper that could be
immediately sold to a third party for the allowed amount of their
claims. The class, in other words, would be entitled to the
equivalent of cash in the form of a promise of future payment.
The courts, however, have rejected a cash equivalency version
of full compensation in reorganization proceedings from the very

41 11

U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. V 1981).

42 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i). This rule is inapplicable when no junior class participates

under the plan; in that instance, the plan can be crammed down on a dissenting class of
unsecured creditors receiving less than the full value of its claims. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
43 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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inception of the doctrine. Using a variety of explanations or rhetoric, the courts generally found that cash equivalency was inconsis-.
tent with the basic theory of debtor rehabilitation and would in
many instances defeat efforts to effectuate a reorganization. At
bottom, they were willing to place a value on an enterprise for reorganization purposes that very likely exceeded the worth that the
market might contemporaneously register for it. Reorganization
value, the critics observed, seems to reflect the court's judgment
about probable market value at some unspecified, but not too distant, future date when various predictions underlying the court's
reorganization valuation will have transpired and when the market
will have been cleared of the stigma and doubts about the enterprise that arose from the very fact that it had been in need of reorganization.4 4 The discrepancy between a reorganization valuation
and a marketplace valuation has been greatest in respect of the
value of an equity position in the ongoing business. But the discrepancy might also reside, although to a lesser extent, in debtor
obligations that emerge from the reorganization-with the gap being smallest at the level of the most senior security.
The more explicit statutory language in the Code regarding
present value 45 has opened anew the cash equivalency argument,
though it seems certain that most courts will still refuse to go the
whole distance. A clear statement to that effect is contained in a'
bankruptcy court opinion in the reorganization of Nite Lite Inns.46
A dissenting creditor class argued that, in accordance with the present value requirement, it "should receive a note in an amount
which would allow the creditor to walk across the street to the
bank and sell the note for the face value of [its] claim. ' ' 47 Confronted with testimony that a bank would discount the indebtedness arising out of the reorganization by forty to fifty percent, the
court responded:
In the present case the showing that the appropriate discount
rate should be 40 to 50 percent is unrealistic in light of current loan practice and the purposes of reorganization under
the Bankruptcy Code. The adoption of such a rate would im4 See Blum, supra note 39, at 417-29.
45 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(2)(c)(i) (Supp. V
1981).
46 In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
47 Id.

at 373.
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pose an artificial and unrealistic burden on any debtor seeking
to reorganize.18
Once cash equivalency is rejected as the test of present value,
courts must then face the challenge of locating a satisfactory alternative. Unfortunately they have gone in several different directions, some clearly unsupportable. It makes no sense to use the
contract interest rate of the claim that has been impaired, 49 inasmuch as that obligation is regarded as accelerated and hence matured by the advent of the bankruptcy proceedings.8 0 Perpetuation
of a contract rate that is low under current conditions can be justified if a default is cured, the position of the creditor in the collateral is reinstated, and he is compensated for damages; continuing
the rate in the absence of these conditions, however, is obviously
unfair to the dissenting creditors. It equally makes no sense to apply the legal rate of interest prescribed by state law. 51 That rate is
always uniform and does not account for the particular risks of
nonpayment germane to the credit circumstances that the dissenting class is being required to accept through a cram down. For the
same reason, automatic application of any other uniform rate, such
as the one the Internal Revenue Service charges on tax obligations
owed to it,52 is also inappropriate.
Perfection obviously cannot be achieved in this area. The best
approach might be to use the Internal Revenue Service
rate-which is tied to the prime rate for the preceding halfyear5 s--as a baseline. The prime rate, speaking generally, is supposed to reflect the rate at which the most credit-worthy borrowers
4 Id.

" Bankruptcy courts have used the contract rate, often averaged with other interest
rates, as the present value discount rate appropriate in personal bankruptcy cases. See, e.g.,
In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 657, 661-62 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (averaged state statutory legal
rate and contract rate); In re Hyden, 10 Bankr. 21, 28 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (averaged
contract rate, state statutory legal rate, and "leveling factor of an arbitrary 6%"); In re
Smith, 4 Bankr. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (presumption under 11 U.S.C. § 1325 that
contract rate and discount rate are equal). The considerations relevant to the selection of an
interest rate are substantially similar in both corporate reorganizations and personal bankruptcy. In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367, 372 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
50 "[B]ankruptey operates as the acceleration of the principal amount of all claims
against the debtor." SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG.

& AD. NEws at 5849.
61 Some courts have used the legal rate. See, e.g., In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 657, 661-62
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (averaged state statutory legal and contract rates); In re Hyden, 10
Bankr. 21, 27-28 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (averaged state statutory legal rate with contract
rate and arbitrary six percent rate).
62I.R.C. § 6621 (West Supp. 1982).
s3Id.
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can obtain funds for relatively short periods. From this baseline
the rate could be adjusted upward to reflect the likely higher bor-.
rowing costs of companies fairly comparable to the debtor in riskiness but not sharing its handicap of being in reorganization.
Under this suggested approach, the interest rate on the coerced investment will vary from half-year to half-year with fluctuations in the index. No index for short-term loans, however, is a
sound baseline for arriving at a fixed rate that is to govern a forced
loan for a period of years. If a fixed rate is sought in such circumstances, then the baseline ought to be a broad interest index for
loans of a duration roughly equal to that of the forced loan imposed by the plan. Adjustments properly would be made from that
measure to reflect the particular level of risk for comparable enterprises not suffering a reorganization handicap."
IV
How does the rate of interest, or discount, on a new obligation
of the debtor bear upon the feasibility of a reorganization plan? 55
The question, taken literally, is perhaps too simple to be useful. The rate of interest standing alone is not meaningful for analysis of feasibility; in every instance, the feasibility of reorganization
will depend on the totality and timing of an interest burden calculated at a particular rate. This can be seen in two simple examples.
First, a plan that calls for $2,000,000 principal amount of debentures carrying a ten percent interest rate is less feasible than a
plan calling for half the principal amount of identical duration debentures carrying a twenty percent interest rate. Although each
version calls for interest payments of $200,000 a year, the principal
to be repaid is smaller in the second plan. The other example con" This suggestion differs from cash equivalence in that, by estimating the present value
of the reorganized debtor's securities by reference to similarly situated corporations, it
removes the stigma of bankruptcy from the estimation of the debtor's worth, perhaps leading to a more realistic valuation.
55 Feasibility is a requirement for plan confirmation. A court may only confirm a plan if
"[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan,
unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11)
(Supp. V 1981). Feasibility has long been a requirement of reorganization. Section
1129(a)(11) is a "slight elaboration of the law that has developed in the application of the
word 'feasible' in Chapter X of the present Act." SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 128,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5914. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, §
221(2), 52 Stat. 840, 897 (1938) (ch. X), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682; id. § 366(3), 52 Stat. 840, 912 (ch. XI), repealed
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §,401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
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cerns two arrangements for repaying a $1000, ten-year loan at a
specified interest rate. One version requires that interest be paid at
the set rate annually; the other prescribes that in lieu of annual
cash payments, an equal amount, thereafter compounded at the
same set rate, be added annually to the sum due at maturity of the
loan. The estimated cash flow of the debtor will determine the feasibility of the two plans. Under both alternatives, the debtor borrows $1000 at the fixed rate of interest, but under the balloon-atthe-end alternative, the prescribed interest rate also applies to reinvestment of the annual interest obligations. The balloon-at-theend plan nevertheless may be more feasible if the debtor expects
cash to be available only in the later years of the loan period, mak56
ing annual payments in the early years impracticable at best.
All these largely mechanical observations had already entered
into the reorganization literature before enactment of the Code;
doubtless they were being taken into account in shaping reorganization plans to clear the feasibility hurdle. Although nothing in the
Code alters their force, one statutory change presents a puzzle as
to the relationship between interest rates and the feasibility of a
plan. The Code, as previously noted, mandates that a plan that
calls for future payments by the debtor cannot be crammed down
on a dissenting class of secured creditors unless (1) the collateral
for the old obligation is carried over to the new promise, (2) the
promised payment is for an amount equal to the allowed amount
of their claims, and (3) the present value of the promise equals the
worth of the collateral. 57 The Code also provides that an undersecured creditor, with or without recourse to other assets of the
debtor, can elect to treat the entire amount of the claim as secured.58 The puzzle is whether, if the election is in force and the
debtor has but a thin equity in the collateral, any plan can ever be
crammed down on a dissenting secured class.
The attempted reorganization of Landmark at Plaza Park,
Ltd.,5 9 a typical real estate tax shelter limited partnership, neatly
illustrates the problem. A nonrecourse first mortgage in the
amount of $2,250,000 was secured by the real estate; the bank-

"A debtor might be able to borrow against expected future cash flows, but the interest
payments required for such a "gap" loan will tend to impair the feasibility of the plan.
67 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
s 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (Supp. V 1981). By electing to treat an entire claim as secured,
the creditor gains a claim, secured by the property, for the full amount of the obligation, but
has no unsecured claim for the excess of the debt over the value of the collateral.
5 In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
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ruptcy court accepted a value of $2,260,000 for the collateral."
Thus the debtor had $10,000 equity in the collateral, assuming
that all other creditors were otherwise taken care of satisfactorily.
The debtor offered a plan, rejected by the mortgagee, that was
built around a new obligation on which payments of principal and
interest were deferred for up to three years, with the discount or
interest computed at 12.5% annually."1 After finding the interest
rate to be too low, the court concluded that a fifteen percent rate
would be proper under the circumstances. 6 2 The court, however,
went on to hold that the plan was not feasible at a fifteen percent
interest rate, inasmuch as there was great doubt that the reorganized debtor would be able to make the total balloon payment at
the end of the three years.6 3
Close analysis of the Landmark opinion suggests that, when
the collateral is the only significant asset of the debtor and the
equity of the debtor in the collateral is thin, it may never be possible to satisfy both the feasibility requirement and the requirement
that the promise to a dissenting creditor class have a present value
equal to the amount of its allowed claim. The value of the collateral presumably is based on discounting expected future net cash
inflows from the encumbered asset; the value of the nonrecourse
promise of the debtor presumably is based on discounting the future payments undertaken by the debtor. Because the debtor's
ability to make good on the promise rests on the ability of the encumbered asset to generate net cash inflows, the identical discount
rate would seem appropriate to both present value calculations.4
60 Id. at 654.
61 Id. at 655. The debtor proposed that no interest would be paid for 15 months and

that interest, computed at 12.5%, would be paid in months 16-36. At the end of the third
year, the debtor would pay the creditor the face amount of $2,705,820.31, equal to the sum
of the value of the collateral, unpaid interest from the first 15 months, and interest at 15%
on the unpaid interest. Id.
62 The court observed that the 12.5% interest rate was less favorable than the creditor
could typically find in the market and hence did not satisfy the statute's requirement that
the plan compensate the creditor for the deficiency. The court noted that loans of the type
the plan envisaged are generally divided between two lenders. For the combined loan, 75%
should carry an interest rate of 13.5-14%, rates at the high end of the range for first mortgage apartment loans. The remaining 25% would bear the rate typically charged in the
second mortgage market, five points above that level, or 19%. The weighted average of these
loans approximated 15%. Id. at 658.
13 At a 15% interest rate, the deferred interest and regular interest payments would
exceed the predicted net rental income and increase in the value of the property, making
future default likely. Id. at 661-63.
" See supra text following note 43. In the situation being discussed, it is assumed that

the debtor does not possess unusual entrepreneurial skills that arguably render the encum-

bered asset more valuable in his than in other hands.
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When virtually all the net cash produced by the collateral is required to satisfy the debtor's obligation under the plan, it is difficult to conceive of how a plan could be feasible under the Code.
Logic might lead to the conclusion that both the feasibility
standard and the fairness standard can be met in circumstances of
this kind only if the debtor yields a substantial share of the equity
in the enterprise to the creditor. This approach, however, is not
available for dealing with an impaired and dissenting secured creditor class that, seeking to foreclose on the collateral, is out to defeat confirmation of any plan. The Code expressly provides that, in
order to cram down a plan on dissenting secured creditors, any
new paper of the debtor must be in the nature of an indebtedness,
not an equity interest.6 5 The use of a realistic interest rate on such
paper, as advocated earlier, may well result in preventing cram
down on such a dissenting class in cases of thin debtor equity.
CONCLUSION

These comments underscore a pervasive point: so long as cram
down in bankruptcy reorganizations rests upon the traditional fair
and equitable standard, the selection of appropriate interest or discount rates will continue to play a central role in designing and
obtaining confirmation of plans.

- 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1981) (secured creditors must receive "deferred
cash payments" and retain their liens).

